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Abstract 
Improving agricultural productivity is a pressing challenge for rapidly growing economies. 
Farmland concentration among core famers is instrumental for reaping the economies of scale. 
However, farmland fragmentation often serves as a barrier to such structural adjustments. 
This paper studies Farmland Improvement Projects in Japan, which physically mitigate 
farmland fragmentation by merging and enlarging small plots and consolidating land parcels 
among farmers. I employ community-level panel data to make use of 
difference-in-differences matching estimators, in order to measure the projects’ impacts. I find 
positive effects of the projects on structural adjustment, in the form of machinery-work 
outsourcing. 
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1.  Introduction 
In becoming more economically industrialized, many countries experience a transition in the 
agricultural sector. A common observation is the migration of the rural population into urban 
areas. This change in the labor market usually accompanies a concentration of farmland among 
farmers who remain in the rural areas, from those who migrated. Consequently, in the midst of 
such transitions, we observe a decline in the total number of farms and an increase in the average 
operational farm size
1. This structural adjustment is imperative for improving the efficiency of the 
agricultural sector, as it reduces inflating labor costs due to rising wages and also leads to benefits 
that arise from economies of scale, largely through the efficient use of agricultural machinery
2. 
Stagnation in farmland concentration implies the retention of inefficient farms and thus a loss of 
competitiveness in the agricultural sector.   
While the success of structural adjustment depends primarily on how land markets function
3, 
this study focuses on farmland fragmentation, a common yet unstudied obstacle that prevents 
smooth land reallocation. Farmland fragmentation is a phenomenon in which farmers operate 
many small, dispersed plots. Although farmland fragmentation could offer benefits in terms of 
reducing risk through the spatial dispersion of plots (Blarel et al. 1992), it comes at the cost of 
increasing the number of work hours and travelling costs involved in moving among the plots; it 
also inhibits the efficient use of agricultural machinery
4. Moreover, farmland fragmentation 
restricts farmland transactions, as it is difficult for farmers to expand farm size without 
exacerbating parcel dispersion,
5  otherwise by finding suitable plots that are adjacent to those they 
already own. Such a phenomenon is commonly observed in Asia (e.g., China, Japan, India, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam), where small-scale farming persists, and in Central and East Europe, where 
the ownership of nationalized farmland has been dispersed through land reforms to numerous 
                                                      
1  Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell (2010) find a positive association between mean farm size and 
GDP. 
2  Note that the implications of farmland concentration differ at different stages of economic 
development. Farmland concentration could be harmful in developing economies where many 
rural people lack access to land and when scales of economy from mechanization are not yet 
present.  
3  For literature on the functioning of land markets, see Deininger (2003) and Otsuka (2007).   
4  Inefficiencies caused by farmland fragmentation have been reported in many countries, such as 
Bangladesh (Rahman and Rahman 2008), Rwanda (Bizimana, Nieuwoudt, and Ferrer 2004), 
Vietnam (Hung, MacAulay, and Marsh 2007), China (Chen, Huffman, and Rozelle 2009; Nguyen, 
Cheng, and Findlay 1996; Wan and Cheung 2001), Jordan (Jabarn and Epplin 1994), and Japan 
(Kawasaki 2010).   
5  In this study, I define a parcel as a block or complex of one or more contiguous plots.   3 
 
family farms
6. These countries therefore face the potential risk of farmland fragmentation, and the 
attendant induced stagnation of structural adjustment could hamper the growth of agriculture and 
industrialization. 
This study examines the case of Japan, which has been suffering from both stagnation 
vis-à-vis structural adjustment and farmland fragmentation. The necessity of structural adjustment 
to improve agricultural productivity via the exertion of economies from scale has been recognized 
since the late 1950s. However, progress in Japan has been slow, and the mean farm size per farm 
household there has remained small (i.e., 1.30 ha in 2005)—at most, one-hundredth the size of 
that in the United States. While there are a number of institutional and cultural reasons behind the 
stagnation of farmland reallocation in Japan, farmland fragmentation has continued to be the 
major land-policy issue. The struggling experience of Japan thus provides important lessons for 
rapidly growing economies—especially in Asia, which faces similar agro-economic land 
conditions. 
To address this situation, the Japanese government has been implementing Farmland 
Improvement Projects (FIPs). Such projects involve farmland readjustment, in which several 
small plots are physically merged and reshaped into one large plot, and farmland consolidation
7, 
which amalgamates the previously dispersed parcels of each farm household through plot 
exchanges among farmers. Existing studies have found that FIPs have had a positive effect on 
farm management, through the reduction of production costs (Kondo 1998; Kiminami and 
Kiminami 2005). It has also been reported that FIPs facilitate rental and farmland concentration 
(Kunimitsu 2008; Takeya 1986; Takahashi 2010). Through its own evaluation, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) (2005b) asserts that FIPs have contributed to the 
prevention of farmland abandonment, improved labor and land productivity, expanded farm size, 
reduced production cost, and concentrated farmland among core farmers. These studies, however, 
tend to be anecdotal or descriptive, and the analyses therein are prone to confounding factors that 
affect structural adjustment and the possibility of endogenous project placement.   
In this study, I estimate the impact of FIPs on structural adjustment and farmland use in 
Niigata prefecture. I use community-level panel data drawn from the Agricultural Census, and 
employ first-difference, difference-in-differences (DID), and (propensity score) matching 
                                                      
6  Some studies of farmland fragmentation include those of Heston and Kumar (1983), Kawasaki 
(2010), Niroula and Thapa (2005), Ram, Tsunekawa, Sahad, and Miyazaki (1999), Sikor, Muller, 
and Stahl (2009), and Tan, Heernik, and Qu (2006). 
7  I explicitly distinguish the concepts of farmland concentration and farmland consolidation in 
the following way. Farmland concentration involves the reallocation of farmland among farm 
households towards fewer core farmers, and it relates to structural adjustment. On the other hand, 
farmland concentration involves the reallocation of farmland within each farm household to 
gather dispersed plots into fewer parcels, and it relates to farmland fragmentation.   4 
 
strategies to estimate impacts. I find that the implementation of an FIP in a community roughly 
doubles the proportion of paddies that outsource some core machinery tasks (e.g., plowing, 
planting, and harvesting). Outsourcing is one form of farmland concentration among operators at 
the operational level; by outsourcing their agricultural machinery, farmers can reduce production 
costs by eliminating operation, maintenance, and renewal costs. FIPs also tend to facilitate 
farmland rental, but estimates are not always precise. I also found that FIPs help keep farmers in 
the agricultural sector. Thus, FIPs seem to have promoted structural adjustments in the form of 
outsourcing without reducing the number of farmers, rather than facilitating farmland 
concentration through exit and reallocation. I discuss within this paper the implications of the 
different modes of structural adjustment.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the context of analysis in 
Japanese agriculture, with a focus on trends vis-à-vis structural adjustment, farmland 
fragmentation, and FIPs. Section 3 presents data and discusses this study’s measurement 
methodology. The impacts that FIPs have had on structural adjustment are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 discusses the mechanism and modes of structural adjustment by examining the effects 
of FIPs vis-à-vis the deterioration of agricultural labor. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Context and institutional background 
2.1.  Concept and modes of structural adjustment 
I define “structural adjustment” in agriculture as the reallocation of resources to reduce costs, 
increase productivity, and gain international competitiveness under a free trade regime. One 
typical manifestation of structural adjustment is farmland concentration. The process begins with 
a deterioration of agricultural labor due to a lag of growth in productivity, which is associated 
with a low wage rate compared to the non-agricultural sector. The outflow of agricultural labor 
increases the supply of farmland. When the reallocation of the released farmlands among farm 
households is successful, the process completes with farmland concentration and an increase in 
the average size of operational farms. Otherwise, farmlands would be abandoned. 
The primary channels by which these released farmlands are reallocated are through 
purchase or rental, causing a concentration of farmland in terms of ownership or management. In 
the Japanese context, outsourcing serves as a third channel. Outsourcing is a form of labor 
division where farmers conduct daily management and care—e.g., the control of water, 
application of fertilizer, and weeding—while outsourcing to core operators heavy seasonal 
machinery operations such as plowing, planting, and harvesting. I consider outsourcing a mode of 
structural adjustment, since it essentially serves to concentrate farmland use among operators at 
the operational (i.e., task) level and helps reduce production cost by eliminating the maintenance 
cost of their agricultural machinery
8.  
                                                      
8  Fujiki (1999) compares Japan with Taiwan in this respect and shows that Taiwanese agriculture 5 
 
 
2.2.  Structural adjustment in Japan
9 
Japan’s rapid economic growth started in the mid-1950s and soon widened disparities in 
productivity and income between its agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, triggering the 
outflow of agricultural labor. The Japanese government intended to narrow income disparity by 
making structural adjustments in the agricultural sector. The expectation was that the outflow of 
agricultural labor would proceed from the closing-down of farm households, and that the 
farmlands would then be released and reallocated. In reality, until the mid-1970s, many farmers 
did not quit farming, but instead became part-time farmers; they successfully shifted their 
households’ labor to the non-agricultural sector without releasing farmland, largely by commuting 
to urban cities on weekdays and managing their farmlands on weekends and holidays.   
Figure 1 depicts Japanese trends in agricultural labor, from 1955 to 2000. The decline in the 
number of farm households and farmers (i.e., the population mainly engaged in farming)—which 
declined during this period by 67.1% and 76.9%, respectively—indicates a clear and quantitative 
deterioration of agricultural labor. Note that the decline in the number of farmers occurred much 
more rapidly than the decline in the number of farm households; this implies that farm 
households have tended to keep their farmlands and to continue farming, albeit with fewer family 
members. Even among those who continued to farm, the qualitative deterioration in terms of 
aging and part-time farming is apparent. The percentage of elderly farmers (i.e., those older than 
60 years) has nearly tripled; in 2005, 70.1% of the farmers were older than 60 years and 78.2% of 
the farm households were farming part-time
10.  
The MAFF has put substantial effort into the facilitation of farmland reallocation through 
purchase and rental, largely by relaxing institutional barriers that hinder farmland transactions. 
However, the average operation size for commercial farm households has increased only minutely, 
from 1.05 ha in 1985 to 1.30 ha in 2005
11. In 1993, the government established the Agricultural 
Management Basis Improvement Law (AMBIL), which identifies core farmers
12; it concentrates 
policy support and accelerates the concentration of farmland to that group of farmers. Through 
                                                                                                                                                              
maintained efficiency through “custom farming,” in which agricultural machinery is shared and 
farmers entrust one another with machinery work. 
9  For brief, English-language summaries of agriculture in Japan, see Hayami and Kawagoe 
(1989), OECD (2009), and Yamashita (2006). 
10  The decline in the ratio of part-time farmers to all farmers was due to aging: those who used to 
farm part-time started to retire from their regular, non-agricultural sector work and thus became 
full-time, elderly farmers. 
11  Excluding Hokkaido, based on MAFF (2007).   
12  Core farmers are those “already or aiming to be an efficient and stable farm and are expected 
to lead the agricultural sector.” 6 
 
AMBIL, the share of farmland operated by core farmers increased from 20% in 1996 to 42% in 
2006; nonetheless, the pace of farmland concentration has been unsatisfactory (MAFF 2008)
13.  
The deterioration of agricultural labor and the stagnation of farmland concentration together 
imply that some of the released farmlands have been left unmanaged. Indeed, the area of 
abandoned farmland has increased; in 2005, it comprised approximately 10% (386,000 ha) of all 
farmland. This situation is exacerbating social concerns with regard to food security, and so the 
prevention of farmland abandonment has become a major goal of agricultural policy.   
 
2.3.  Farmland fragmentation and farmland improvement projects 
Why is structural adjustment in Japan stagnant? On the supply side, it is often said that 
farmers tend to hold their farmland and wait for opportunities to sell it to developers, as 
converting it to housing or commercial purposes offers a higher selling price. Also, many farmers 
have emotional or sentimental attachments to plots inherited from ancestors, and thus hesitate to 
release their farmlands
14. On the demand side, MAFF (2008) reports that the two most frequently 
cited reasons for the stagnation of farmland concentration are the instability of farm income and 
the prices of agricultural products, implying that even core farmers cannot risk farm-size 
expansions.  
In this study, I focus on the third most frequently cited reason: farmland fragmentation. 
MAFF (2008) reports the survey result that although core farmers tend to have larger farm sizes, 
their plots are typically small and dispersed: the average operation size of the 203 sampled core 
farmers was 14.8 ha, but their plots were dispersed over, on average, 28.5 separate parcels. The 
dispersion of parcels increases the number of work hours needed to move among the parcels, and 
the smallness of the plots hinders the efficient use of agricultural machinery; these are the major 
causes of low productivity in Japanese agriculture (Kawasaki 2010, 2011). The unprofitability of 
agriculture has led to a decline in the number of farm households and a general lack of core 
farmers. The key issue is that farmland concentration (and an increase in mean farm size) is 
actually not sufficient; the parcels need to be concentrated contiguously.   
To address this situation, the Japanese government has been implementing FIPs
15, which 
improve production conditions by developing infrastructure pertaining to irrigation, drainage, and 
roads, and by facilitating farmland readjustments that physically merge and reshape several small 
plots into larger plots (figure 2). After farmland is readjusted, farmers can negotiate with regard 
to which new plots they will take. Throughout the reallocation process, for each farmer, 
                                                      
13  In 2005, the MAFF established its vision, that 70–80% of the farmland would be concentrated 
among core farmers by 2015.   
14  This kind of emotional sentiment is also reported in Nepal (Thapa and Niroula 2008) and 
Central Europe (van Dijk 2007). 
15  For a brief overview of FIPs in Japan, see Nakashima (2005).   7 
 
previously dispersed plots are consolidated into one or two parcels (i.e., farmland consolidation).   
FIPs are implemented by the central government or prefectures based on requests from rural 
communities. Each project site must have a minimum coverage area of 20 ha. A project 
implementation can be forced by agreement among more than two-thirds of the landowners in the 
project area. Typically, half of each project’s budget is funded by the government, 30% by 
prefectures, and the remainder by municipalities and farm households. Due to budgetary 
limitations, it is common for several years to pass before a project is initiated. 
The primary objective of an FIP is to improve the productivity of individual farms. However, 
since the AMBIL in 1993, emphasis has shifted to structural adjustments: increasing farmland 
transactions, nurturing core farmers, and concentrating farmland among core farmers (MAFF 
2005a). There are several reasons to expect that FIPs will enhance farmland concentration.   
On the demand side, improvements in production conditions reduce production costs and 
likely stimulate the demand for farm-size expansion among core farmers. FIPs also make it much 
easier and less costly than is otherwise the case to expand farm size, because one need rent or 
purchase only one plot instead of many small plots to obtain the same aggregate size of farmland. 
This lowers the transaction costs associated with searching and negotiating with different 
landowners, and it also reduces the difficulties inherent in managing many dispersed parcels.   
On the supply side, the physical transformation of plots due to farmland readjustment is said 
to ease farmers’ emotional bonds or sentimental attachment to plots inherited from ancestors and 
lessen their hesitation to sell or rent them (Kunimitsu 2008). It is also indicated that FIPs mitigate 
asymmetric information on plots’ soil conditions, because the readjustment physically shuffles 
and equalizes the soils among merged plots. Furthermore, FIP implementation encourages 
farmers to plan future operations and is likely to promote retirement, farmland rental, or 
outsourcing by elderly farmers and small, part-time farmers
16. Finally, some FIPs require that a 
certain share of farmland must be concentrated among core farmers as a condition of the FIP 
implementation; this also boosts farmland rental and outsourcing.   
 
3.  Data and method 
3.1.  Data  
I focus on the impact of FIPs in Niigata prefecture. Although Niigata is the second-largest 
rice-producing prefecture in Japan, the progress of FIPs there has been slow. A considerable 
number of FIPs have been implemented in recent years, to catch up with other areas. Between 
1993 and 2001, Niigata increased its area of readjusted paddies by 14,751 ha—the highest among 
                                                      
16  FIPs could bring about the opposite effect (i.e., suppress the supply of farmland), since 
improvements in production conditions would enable the continuation of cultivation by elderly 
farmers. Thus, it could affect both labor deterioration and structural adjustment. I discuss this 
issue in Section 5. 8 
 
all prefectures for that period
17. 
I use information from the Rural Community Card, World Census of Agriculture and 
Forestry 2000 in this analysis. The unit of observation is the rural community—which, according 
to that Census, is the “smallest unit of regional society in rural villages.” The data are constructed 
by aggregating household-level census data from the Farm Household Survey for farm 
households residing in each community. This is the most detailed and comprehensive data 
available for the purpose of the study. I emphasize three limitations therein. First, many variables 
on farmland area (owned, managed, rented-in, outsourcing) do not necessarily accord with the 
actual (area-basis) farmland area within the regional domain of each community. This is because 
the data are constructed on a farmer basis (i.e., by summing up the area data of farm households 
who reside in each community), and some farmers own or manage farmlands outside the resident 
community
18. Second, the area of readjusted paddies used as the indicator of FIP implementation 
is on an area basis, and such numbers are derived from the Rural Community Survey
19. Thus, I 
concede that the key variables come from different surveys, and that there may be some 
inconsistencies between the two. Third, I find some farmland area data of the Rural Community 
Survey inconsistent over time
20. Therefore, I refrain from using the absolute area and instead use 
the ratio of area of paddies readjusted over the (total) area of paddies, expecting that the data are 
more consistent within each time point. 
Table 1 reports the definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
In 1990, on average, there were 23.7 farm households managing a total of 30.0 ha of paddies in 
one rural community. However, the figures show a clear deterioration of agricultural labor: during 
1990–2000, the number of farm households declined by 20.3% (by 4.8 households) and the 
proportion of elderly farmers (those above 65 years old) increased by 58.4%, from 36.4% to 
57.7%. These numbers are roughly on par with the national averages of the time
21.  
                                                      
17  However, in 2001, the proportion of area comprising readjusted paddies in Niigata was still 
50.3%, which is still lower than the national average of 57.4%. 
18  Strictly speaking, “the area of farmland managed in a community” is “the area of farmland 
managed by farm households residing in that community.” I report in Table 1 the area of paddies 
on an area basis. The mean area of paddies on an area basis is 32.6 ha, whereas the area of 
paddies managed on a farmer basis is 29.7 ha. The difference comes from management in and 
outside the resident community and the measurement error of the area-basis data.   
19  This Survey is one component of the World Census of Agriculture and Forestry, which 
interviews “prominent residents” in each community to gather information on that community’s 
circumstances. 
20  I observe several large increase or decrease in the (area-basis) area of paddies, which is quite 
unlikely in the Japanese context.   
21  From 1990 to 2000, the number of farm households declined by 21.1%, and the proportion of 9 
 
The question is whether the paddies that belonged to exiting farm households were 
successfully reallocated or managed by those who remained. The figure shows that the released 
paddies were reallocated through rental, rather than through purchase: the paddy area owned 
declined by 4.5 ha (16.6%), from 27.1 ha to 22.6 ha; meanwhile, the paddy area rented increased 
by 2.0 ha (54.0%). However, neither reallocation nor rental could help manage released farmland 
sufficiently. The paddy area managed declined by 2.5 ha (8.3%) and the abandoned farmland area 
increased by 0.09 ha (10.2%). On the other hand, the increasing areas of paddy accepting various 
agricultural work indicate that more paddies (presumably those owned by elderly farmers) were 
handled through outsourcing.   
The primary indicator of FIP implementation in a community is the value of the 
variable %Readjusted, which is the ratio of the area of readjusted paddies to the total area of 
paddies. While this is a measure of farmland readjustment, it is usually combined with 
considerations of infrastructure development and farmland consolidation. Therefore, the 
measured impact reflects the composite effects of these project components. I also adopt a binary 
indicator of project implementation to compare the “treated” and “control” (i.e., untreated) 
communities. The variable is set to unity if the area of readjusted farmland increased and the ratio 
of readjusted farmland increased by 25 percentage points
22 between 1990 and 2000; otherwise, 
the variable is set to 0.   
The outcomes of interest are the progress of structural adjustment and farmland use (i.e., 
prevention of farmland abandonment). As the primary indicator of farmland concentration, I 
examine the ratio of large farm households managing more than 2 ha
23. The ratios of the paddy 
areas rented and of paddy areas accepting various entrusted agricultural work (i.e., all work
24, 
plowing and puddling, rice planting, and mowing and threshing) capture the extent of farmland 
rental and outsourcing. Finally, the ratio of area of abandoned farmland measures the level of 
farmland use.   
 
3.2.  Empirical strategy 
I adopt a first-difference estimator to estimate the impact of FIPs on structural adjustment. 
Since the data at hand have only two time points, this is equivalent to a fixed-effect estimator. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
elderly farmers increased by 59.5% (33.7% in 1990 and 53.8% in 2000; excluding Hokkaido). 
22  As a robustness check, I also apply 50 percentage points as the criterion and obtain similar 
results.  
23  This is in fact not very large at all, but it is the largest comparable farm size category common 
to the two censuses.   
24  The difference between rental and the outsourcing of “all farm work” is in whether or not a 
landowner has outsourced management: if a landowner outsources plot management, then this is 
considered a rental.   10 
 
estimated model is   
 
  Δ          % R e a d j u s t e d               ,      ( 1 )  
 
where   denotes the difference between 1990 and 2000,    is the outcome variable of 
community    in  year  ,  %Readjusted    is the ratio of readjusted farmland, and      is  the  error 
term.  
This method utilizes intertemporal variation within each community, so any time-invariant 
component of omitted variable bias is eliminated. However, in the regressions, I explicitly control 
for some of the time-invariant community characteristics (  ) that might affect the trends of 
outcomes: the gradient of paddies, remoteness (i.e., time distance to densely inhibited districts), 
and zoning (i.e., zoning for city planning area and for agricultural promotion area). Urban areas 
are designated as city planning areas, and urban planning regulates land use within the area
25. On 
the other hand, regions suitable for farming are designated as “agricultural promotion areas.” 
Within an “agricultural promotion area,” some zones are further designated as “farmland area,” 
where paddies and upland fields are preserved for agricultural use and conversion to housing or 
commercial purposes is prohibited. Farmers in the communities under this zoning should be less 
reluctant to rent out their farmland.   
For the second estimation strategy, I use DID estimators, which are often used for policy 
evaluation. The estimation model is: 
 
  Δ                        ,       ( 2 )  
 
where      is the binary treatment dummy. This is simply a replacement of %Readjusted in eq. (1) 
with a binary variable    . The DID estimator compares changes in outcomes between treated and 
control communities. Comparing the two groups differences out any common trends in the 
outcomes. Moreover, by differencing the outcomes between the two time points for each 
community, DID estimators eliminate all the time-invariant variables. 
The DID estimators assume that in the absence of treatment, the outcomes of the two groups 
will follow parallel trends
26. This is a strong assumption, if the initial characteristics of the two 
groups are different and if these characteristics are likely to correlate with outcome trends. This is 
indeed a concern; as I show below, the treated communities tended to have favorable production 
                                                      
25  Within a city planning area, there are three zones: an “urbanization-promotion area” promotes 
urbanization, whereas an “urbanization-control area” prohibits construction and development. 
There are also “blank areas” that are within the city planning area but not designated as either an 
“urbanization-promotion area” or an “urbanization-control area.” 
26  For a discussion of this issue, see Ravallion (2008) and Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2009). 11 
 
conditions. To address this issue, I employ a DID matching strategy as a further robustness 
check—that is, for each treated community, I match one or several control communities that are 
alike, based on the covariates or estimated propensity score, and compare the changes in 
outcomes between the matched communities (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd 1997)
27. Namely, the sample average treatment effect for treated is 
 
     
 
  
∑      ,         ,       ∑        ,         ,      |        |     , (3) 
 
where      and     denote the outcome of treated and control communities, respectively, and 
     ∑      , and     is the determined weight, depending on the employed matching algorithm. 
By combining matching with the DID estimator, I can eliminate the time-varying biases based on 
observables
28.  
I apply nearest-neighbor covariate matching and local linear matching as matching 
algorithms
29. For the nearest-neighbor covariate matching, I match each treated community with 
the five or ten control communities that are most alike, based on an inverse variance-weighting 
matrix (Abadie and Imbens 2002, 2006). I use the bias-correction proposed by Abadie and 
Imbens (2002), which removes the conditional bias asymptotically. The variance estimator 
implemented by Abadie and Imbens (2006) is used for estimating the standard errors. For local 
linear matching, I match the communities based on the propensity scores estimated by probit 
regression. I use the Epanechnikov distribution as the kernel function and set the bandwidth to 
0.1
30. I obtain standard errors by bootstrapping with 100 repetitions. Samples are restricted to 
communities that suffice common support, to avoid bad matches
31. I carry out all the matching 
with replacement, so that a control community can be matched against different treated 
communities.  
I can make two remarks on issues regarding “treatment” and its effects. First, although I 
regard FIP implementation to be binary in the DID framework, that implementation could be 
measured continuously by %Readjusted; it is also possible to add treatment, on top of past 
projects. For example, a community with a 20% share of readjusted farmland can implement 
additional projects to increase the share to 60%. This raises the issue of distinguishing the 
                                                      
27  See Todd (2008) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for excellent surveys of program 
evaluation using matching methods. 
28  Note, however, that time-varying biases caused by unobservable items will remain. 
29  The impact is estimated with Stata 11, using the “nnmatch” (Abadie et al. 2004) and 
“psmatch2” commands.   
30  I use bandwidths of 0.06, 0.08, 0.1, and 0.2, and the results thereof are quantitatively similar. 
31  In practice, treatment communities whose propensity scores are higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum propensity scores of the controls are dropped.   12 
 
long-term effect of past treatment (20%) from the short-term effect of the additional 40%. In fact, 
we can expect instantaneous effects as well as long-term effects. As discussed in Section 2, 
short-term effects can indicate that the project may work as a catalyst to urge retirement among 
elderly farmers. On the other hand, long-term effects would reflect increased demand or supply, 
or decreased transaction costs. Since the data at hand have only two time points, separation of 
these effects is a task left for future research.   
Second, the possibility of long-lasting effects raises the issue of defining a comparison group. 
For example, communities that had not implemented an FIP during our observation period are not 
suitable for comparison with treated communities that implemented a project during the same 
period. This is because many of these “untreated” control communities had implemented a project 
in the past: the mean percentage of readjusted farmland in 1990 among control communities was 
76.4%—61.2% points higher than the figure of 15.2% among treated communities (    0.001). 
To address these issues, I restrict in the main estimations the samples to communities that never 
implemented a project before 1990.   
 
4.  Results: the impact of FIP on structural adjustment   
4.1.  First-difference estimates 
Table 2, panel A, provides the first-difference estimates. The results reveal that FIPs 
promote outsourcing. %Readjusted also has a positive association with farmland concentration 
(i.e., ratio of large farm households) and rental and a negative correlation with farmland 
abandonment, but the coefficients are not precisely estimated. The coefficients of the 
time-invariant community characteristics point to how various community conditions correlate 
with the trend of structural adjustment. I find that communities with steeper-gradient paddies tend 
to have slower structural adjustment trends. The expansion of rental, and therefore farmland 
concentration, lags behind “flat” communities; outsourcing also lags, but the coefficients are 
mostly insignificant. Such a tendency is also confirmed for the level of outcomes, using simple 
pooled cross-sectional regressions (not shown). Clearly, structural-adjustment delays in these 
steeper communities seem to stem from their unfavorable production conditions. Remote 
communities (measured by time-distance to a densely inhabited district) tend to be left behind in 
terms of farmland concentration to large farm households and rental expansions. Correlations 
with outsourcing are complex and the implications thereof are less clear. As expected, rental 
expansion is larger in communities within the agricultural promotion area, where farmland 
conversion is prohibited.   
Table 2, panel B, addresses the aforementioned possibility of results contamination from the 
long-lasting effects of past project implementation. The first row reports the estimates of eq. (1), 
while the second row reports the estimates with pretreatment %Readjusted in 1990, to control for 
the possible long-lasting effects of past projects. The results in the third row are the estimates 
using a restricted sample of communities that were never treated prior to 1990 (i.e., %Readjusted 13 
 
in 1990 is 0). In addition to eliminating the long-lasting effects of past projects, the sample 
restriction has the benefit of increasing the precision of estimates, because it excludes many 
communities in which the dependent variable did not change over time
32. The results reveal that 
the absolute values of the coefficients tend to become larger from the first row to the third row, 
suggesting that the project impact is underestimated due to the long-lasting effects. Thus, it is 
crucial to account for this bias. 
The coefficients in the third row indicate that if all the paddies in a never-treated community 
were readjusted (i.e., %Readjusted increases by 100%), the ratios of area accepting plowing and 
puddling, rice planting, and mowing and threshing would increase by 2.7, 1.3, and 2.3 percentage 
points, respectively. These are quite sizable increases, given that the initial levels of those ratios 
in 1990 for never-treated communities were fairly low: 2.0%, 1.4%, and 2.7%, respectively. Thus, 
full readjustment is associated with the effect that roughly doubles the initial ratio of areas that 
outsource this work.   
 
4.2.  Difference-in-differences and matching estimates 
In the analysis below, I use the binary treatment indicator and examine the impact within the 
DID framework of FIPs. I also restrict the sample to the 1,094 communities for 
which %Readjusted was 0 in 1990, to cope with underestimation due to long-lasting effects. Even 
so, I still keep 61.1% (i.e., 496 of 812) of the communities that implemented FIPs during the 
observation period. Of the 1,094 never-treated communities, 496 had been treated by 2000; the 
remaining 598 communities form the control group. Since these communities had not 
implemented FIPs before 1990, the estimates are likely to be at the upper limit; however, the 
restricted sample tends to exhibit fewer favorable production conditions than those that had some 
farmland readjustment before 1990
33. Thus, the estimates should be lower than the actual impact 
of the project for communities with average conditions.   
Before addressing the DID estimates, I first check the determinants of project 
implementation. Table 3 reports the probit estimates of the determinants of FIP implementation. 
The results imply that the communities with relatively favorable conditions tended to implement 
FIPs: treated communities were likely to have flatter gradients and be relatively close to urban 
areas. Zoning also seems to matter: treated communities were either likely to be within an 
urbanization promotion area or within an agricultural promotion area. These findings imply that 
                                                      
32  In our case, %Readjusted did not change from 1990 to 2000 in 1,694 of the 4,780 communities, 
because all of their farmland had already been fully readjusted by 1990. Inclusion of these 
communities in the estimation would have increased standard errors. 
33  The percentage of communities with a steep gradient was 41.4% among communities with no 
farmland readjustment prior to 1990 and 11.0% among communities that had at least some 
farmland readjustment before 1990 (  0 . 0 0 1   for all comparisons). 14 
 
outcome trends between treated and control communities might derive from differences in initial 
community conditions, which could lead to the overestimation of the impact of FIPs. 
I employ a matching strategy to eliminate the potential time-variant bias caused by 
differences in initial community conditions. The propensity scores used for local linear matching 
are obtained from the probit regression (table 3). After matching, the treated and control groups 
should be similar in terms of their distributions of community characteristics. I check balancing 
by the mean absolute standardized bias proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and the test 
proposed by Sianesi (2004). Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results of the balancing test for 
local linear matching. The mean absolute standardized biases are sufficiently below the critical 
level of 20% suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The pseudo    obtained from probit 
regression after matching is close to 0, and the likelihood ratio test of joint significance of the 
regressors implies that there is no systematic difference between the treated and control groups. 
Table 4 provides DID estimates. Panels A and B report simple unmatched-DID estimates, 
and panel C reports matched-DID estimates. The estimates in panel A are derived from 
regressions, with the readjustment indicator as the only explanatory variable. The coefficient of 
the readjustment dummy measures the difference in the changes of unconditional means of 
outcomes between treated and control communities; the constant measures changes among 
control communities. The estimates in panel B control for time-invariant community 
characteristics.  
The results are mostly qualitatively similar and consistent, except for the sign of the ratio of 
large farm households, which turns negative after matching. The magnitude of the coefficients are 
slightly smaller than the first-difference estimates (third row of table 2, panel B), since the mean 
coverage of readjustment for treated communities is 87.2% (compared to 100% for the reading of 
the results in table 2). The magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients do vary to 
some extent, depending on whether the samples are matched and on the algorithm used for 
matching
34. The results show that in most cases, the impact on the outsourcing of each of plowing 
and puddling, rice planting, and mowing and threshing is significantly positive. A simple 
                                                      
34  For example, the percentage of the area of paddies in which plowing and puddling for the 
treated communities in 1990 had been outsourced was 2.51%. Panel A indicates that the trend 
from 1990 to 2000 increased this ratio by 0.28 percentage points (i.e., a change in control 
communities or in the magnitude of the constant). In addition, the FIP added another 2.32 
percentage points for treatment communities, thus roughly doubling the ratio ((0.0251 + 0.0028 + 
0.0232)/0.025 = 2.04). Since the mean area of paddies for the treated communities in 1990 was 
28.2 ha, these communities increased the outsourced area from 0.71 ha (=28.2 ha × 0.0251) to 
1.43 ha (=0.71 ha × 2.04). Similarly, the effects on planting, and mowing and threshing are 0.58 
ha to 1.24 ha (215%) and 0.98 ha to 1.56 ha (159%), respectively. 15 
 
calculation indicates that the treated communities roughly doubled their outsourced areas
35. The 
negative estimates on the ratio of abandoned farmland imply that the FIPs slowed down farmland 
abandonment, but the coefficients are no longer significant after matching.   
In summary, the results suggest that FIPs contributed to expansions in outsourcing. The 
impact of FIPs on farmland concentration in terms of the appearance of a greater number of large 
farm households, more rentals, and the prevention of farmland abandonment is in the expected 
direction, but it is not statistically significant. The finding that structural adjustment proceeded in 
outsourcing rather than in purchase or rental is consistent with the argument that improvements in 
farming conditions, as brought about by FIPs, make it possible for even small-scale and elderly 
farmers to continue farming, thereby reducing farmland supplies (Kondo 1998; Kunimitsu 2008). 
In fact, many elderly farmers do prefer to manage their farmland on their own, for as long as they 
are capable. As farmers age, they start to outsource work that requires strength or is considered 
dangerous. Even so, it is not unusual for elderly farmers to hold ownership while outsourcing 
most of the core operations
36. In this context, it may not be necessary for farmland concentration 
to proceed in the forms of purchase or rental. Outsourcing can serve as a solution, as long as it 
helps reduce production costs and prevent farmland from being abandoned.   
 
5.  Farmland improvement projects and deterioration of agricultural labor 
Thus far, the evidence suggests that in Japan, FIPs fostered structural adjustments in the form 
of outsourcing, without pushing farmers to exit the agricultural sector. In this section, I 
specifically examine the effect of FIPs on labor deterioration. For this purpose, I conduct an 
exploratory regression on the covariates of farmers’ exit, aging, and part-time farming. 
Table 5 reports the DID estimates while using the restricted sample. The coefficients of the 
constants confirm the general trend of the decline in the number of farm households and the rise 
in the proportion of elderly farmers. Such tendencies are more prominent in communities with a 
steeper gradient. Again, such unfavorable production conditions seem to accelerate deterioration. 
On the other hand, communities within agricultural promotion areas experienced slower trends in 
farmers’ exit and aging. The coefficients of the readjustment dummy and its interactions with 
gradient dummies help one examine the effect of FIPs on labor deterioration. Columns (2) and (3) 
indicate that FIPs slow down farmers’ exit; this effect, however, is weaker (though not 
statistically significantly so) in steeper communities. On the other hand, FIPs slow down the trend 
                                                      
35  Note that the ratio of abandoned farmland is actually increasing, even in treated communities; 
FIPs are only slowing it down. The magnitude of the constant in the DID estimate is positive and 
greater than the absolute value of the coefficient of the readjustment dummy. 
36  Most often, even after outsourcing most of the heavy machinery work, elderly farmers tend to 
continue daily water control—an activity that requires experience but not strength and is critical 
to the quality of produce (i.e., rice). 16 
 
of farmer aging in steeper communities, compared to “flat” communities.   
These results seem to imply that improvements in production conditions due to FIPs enable 
farmers to continue farming in “flat” communities, but that they encourage farmers’ exit in 
steeper communities by promoting elderly farmer retirement. This should influence the mode of 
structural adjustment. In “flat” communities, structural adjustment would occur through rental 
and outsourcing, since farmers stay and continue to farm; in steeper communities, on the other 
hand, structural adjustment is more likely to proceed through the reallocation of farmland, 
because farmers exit. Table 6 supports this hypothesis: it reports the unmatched-DID estimates of 
the readjustment dummy and its interactions with gradient dummies on structural adjustment, and 
the results show a clear pattern that the impact of FIPs on rental and outsourcing is stronger for 
“flat” communities than for steeper communities. On the other hand, structural adjustment in 
steeper communities tends to proceed through the concentration of farmland toward large farm 
households.  
 
6.  Concluding remarks   
In the agricultural sector of an industrialized economy, structural adjustment and farmland 
concentration are the bases for improving productivity, by harnessing economies of scale. In this 
study, I focused on farmland fragmentation, a physical barrier that could potentially hamper 
structural adjustment in many developing and developed countries around the world. I 
investigated the impact of Farmland Improvement Projects (FIPs) in Japan, by which small plots 
of land are merged and enlarged, often consolidating parcels among farmers. FIPs are expected to 
improve productivity and facilitate farmland transactions through stimulated supply and demand 
and lower transaction costs, and prevent farmland abandonment.   
The results reveal that FIPs facilitated the outsourcing of agricultural work—which is a form 
of farmland-use concentration—at the operational level, to core farmers. The correlation with the 
extent of rentals and the prevention of farmland abandonment was positive but not precisely 
estimated. I also found that FIPs have some effect in helping farmers remain in the agricultural 
sector. Thus, FIPs seem to have promoted structural adjustment in the form of outsourcing, 
without reducing the number of farmers, rather than facilitating farmland concentration through 
purchase or rental.   
Of exit and farmland concentration (purchase and rental) and continuation and outsourcing, 
which mode of structural adjustment is most desirable? The primary intention of structural 
adjustment is to improve efficiency, so the question is which mode of structural adjustment best 
reduces production costs? While a detailed study is required to answer this question, the answer 
could potentially depend on the extent of farmland fragmentation. If a core farmer cannot expand 
his farm size (through purchase or rental) without exacerbating fragmentation, then the 
concentration of farmland could be costly, because it would increase recurrent travelling costs 
(Kawasaki 2010). Such costs could be reduced via outsourcing, because each farm household 17 
 
undertakes its own, separate daily management for its own plots. Another viewpoint considers the 
ability to prevent farmland abandonment: the results of examinations of outsourcing imply that 
small-scale or elderly farmers are still taking some part in farming. This sustains their 
engagement in farming and contributes to the collective management of common pool 
resources—such as irrigation, drainage, and farm road infrastructure—that are important factors 
in preventing farmland abandonment. Thus, the modes of structural adjustment may have 
different implications with regard to reducing production costs and preventing farmland 
abandonment; the optimal choice of mode seems to be context-dependent. More study is needed 
to assess the desirability of various structural-adjustment modes.   
The case study of Japan suggests that projects similar to FIPs may help other countries 
alleviate farmland fragmentation and facilitate the concentration of farmland among efficient and 
motivated farmers. However, such projects tend to be quite expensive. A rigorous cost–benefit 
analysis should be conducted prior to any project implementation. The results of heterogeneous 
effects may suggest the selective use of resources in areas that have less favorable conditions. 
Finally, it should be noted that since FIPs facilitate land concentration, care might be needed to 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
 
Note: Figures are aggregate of management-level data in each community (farmer basis), except for variables denoted with an asterisk, 
which are on an area basis. The area of paddy rent-out is smaller than the area of paddy rent-in, primarily because non-farmer landowners 
rent-out their farmland but were not covered in the Census, as they are not farmers.   
% change
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Labor
Number of farm households Total number of farm households 23.7 18.9 18.9 15.7 ‐0.203
Number of farmers Population engaged in farming 33.2 29.3 28.8 26.0 ‐0.133
Number of large farm households 3.2 4.9 2.6 4.0 ‐0.181
Number of elderly famers Population engaged in farming above 65 years old 11.7 10.4 16.1 13.9 0.375
Number of part‐time farm households 22.0 17.8 17.0 14.5 ‐0.226
Ratio of large farm households 0.211 0.244 0.242 0.259 0.145
Ratio of elderly farmers Denominator = total population engaged in farming 0.364 0.165 0.577 0.178 0.584
Ratio of part‐time farm households Denominator = total number of farm households 0.922 0.114 0.891 0.140 ‐0.033
Land (units in 1a=0.01ha)
Area of paddy, managed (owned)‐(rent‐out)‐(abandoned)+(rent‐in) 2974.3 3009.2 2726.9 2932.1 ‐0.083
Area of paddy, rent‐in 362.2 481.0 557.8 750.2 0.540
Area of paddy, rent‐out 97.4 199.1 90.5 172.4 ‐0.070
Area of paddy, owned 2709.4 2749.3 2259.6 2421.7 ‐0.166
Area of paddy under outsourcing… Area of paddy accepting various agricultural works
   All services 35.2 167.1 42.0 387.4 0.192
   Plowing and puddling 99.3 296.1 119.9 537.3 0.207
   Rice planting 97.0 282.1 135.7 422.6 0.398
   Mowing and threshing 151.9 362.8 192.2 539.6 0.265
Area of farmland, owned farmland = paddy+upland+orchard 3043.9 3027.0 2519.6 2664.5 ‐0.172
Area of farmland, abandoned farmland = paddy+upland+orchard 83.3 175.8 91.8 147.1 0.102
Area of paddy, abandoned N.A. N.A. 56.1 97.9
Area of farmland* Area‐based, farmland = paddy+upland+orchard N.A. N.A. 3527.4 3654.4
Area of paddy* Area‐based 3264.3 3320.3 3067.3 3304.3 ‐0.060
Area of paddy, readjusted* Area‐based 2477.4 3299.5 2688.3 3351.0 0.085
Ratio of area of paddy, readjusted* Area‐based 0.654 0.423 0.766 0.368 0.172
Treatment indicator







Ratio of area rented‐in Denominator = Area of paddy, managed 0.117 0.104 0.187 0.143 0.595
Ratio of area accepting… Denominator = Area of paddy, managed
    All services Denominator = Area of paddy, managed 0.012 0.066 0.014 0.116 0.140
    Plowing and puddling Denominator = Area of paddy, managed 0.036 0.099 0.043 0.147 0.213
    Rice planting Denominator = Area of paddy, managed 0.031 0.086 0.045 0.124 0.433
    Mowing and threshing Denominator = Area of paddy, managed 0.049 0.110 0.064 0.168 0.299



























Table 2. First-difference estimates 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard error reported in 
parenthesis. Omitted categories of the dummy variables are: “flat” for “agricultural area,” “less than 30 minutes” for “distance to DID,” 
“not in city planning area” for “city planning area,” and “not in agricultural promotion area” for “agricultural promotion area.” Results in 
panel B control for change in time-variant community characteristics (e.g., ratio of part-time farmers, ratio of elderly farmers, and number 
of farm households). “With initial value” indicates that the 1990 value of ratio of readjusted farmland is included as an independent 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A.
Change in ratio of readjusted paddies ‐0.00280 ‐0.00379 0.0104 0.0166** 0.00853* 0.00199 ‐0.0134
(0.00472) (0.00506) (0.0102) (0.00681) (0.00504) (0.00616) (0.0144)
Gradient (gentle) ‐0.00987*** ‐0.00608 ‐0.00282 ‐0.00536 0.00382 ‐0.00675 0.0194
(0.00338) (0.00385) (0.00536) (0.00601) (0.00491) (0.00627) (0.0203)
Gradient (steep) ‐0.0151*** ‐0.0138*** ‐0.00527 ‐0.00753 ‐0.00902* ‐0.000999 ‐0.0196
(0.00371) (0.00502) (0.00424) (0.00719) (0.00547) (0.0107) (0.0149)
Distance to DID (0.5 to 1 hr) ‐0.00706* ‐0.00602 0.00175 ‐0.00914* ‐0.00103 ‐0.00368 ‐0.0145
(0.00376) (0.00483) (0.00395) (0.00501) (0.00438) (0.00610) (0.0158)
Distance to DID (1 to 1.5 hr) ‐0.0116** ‐0.00566 0.000966 0.0216 0.0132* 0.0320*** 0.00235
(0.00496) (0.00911) (0.00729) (0.0146) (0.00796) (0.0123) (0.0141)
Distance to DID (more than 1.5 hr) 0.0118 0.00215 ‐0.0629** 0.0430 0.0378 0.0354 ‐0.0319
(0.0222) (0.0469) (0.0317) (0.0590) (0.0438) (0.0509) (0.0476)
City planning area ‐0.000385 0.0303 0.0207** ‐0.0548 0.00242 ‐0.0682 ‐0.0168
    (Urbanization promotion area) (0.0166) (0.0189) (0.00896) (0.0545) (0.0103) (0.0570) (0.0234)
City planning area ‐0.00918** ‐0.000570 0.00691 ‐0.0141** ‐0.00317 ‐0.00620 ‐0.0144
    (Urbanization control area) (0.00452) (0.00449) (0.00580) (0.00617) (0.00527) (0.00649) (0.0166)
City planning area ‐0.00579* ‐0.00652* 0.00206 ‐0.0153*** ‐0.00861* ‐0.00767 ‐0.0272
    (Blank area) (0.00342) (0.00391) (0.00457) (0.00533) (0.00485) (0.00691) (0.0240)
Agricultural promotion area ‐0.0109 0.0294* 0.0103 ‐0.00468 0.0577*** ‐0.0190 0.0836
    (Blank area) (0.0106) (0.0168) (0.00757) (0.0627) (0.0147) (0.0649) (0.0919)
Agricultural promotion area 0.00101 0.0367** 0.00984 ‐0.0541 0.0117 ‐0.0673 ‐0.0151
     (Farmland area) (0.00968) (0.0155) (0.00723) (0.0615) (0.00822) (0.0642) (0.0129)
Constant 0.0400*** 0.0436*** ‐0.0103 0.0681 0.00236 0.0832 0.0355
(0.0102) (0.0157) (0.00842) (0.0635) (0.00970) (0.0662) (0.0216)
Observations 4,648 4,647 4,647 4,647 4,647 4,647 4,679
Adjusted R
2 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.004
Panel B. (coefficients of the ratio of readjusted paddies)
Full sample, without %Readjusted in 1990 ‐0.00280 ‐0.00379 0.0104 0.0166** 0.00853* 0.00199 ‐0.0134
(0.00472) (0.00506) (0.0102) (0.00681) (0.00504) (0.00616) (0.0144)
Full sample, with %Readjusted in 1990 0.00536 0.00626 0.00557 0.0188** 0.0105* 0.0126 0.0186
(0.00545) (0.00680) (0.00802) (0.00744) (0.00552) (0.00796) (0.0152)
Restricted sample, without %Readjusted in 1990 0.00819 0.0127 0.0142 0.0271*** 0.0127** 0.0229** ‐0.00739




Table 3. Probit estimates of project placement (marginal effects) 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard error reported in 





































Table 4. Difference-in-differences and matching estimates 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard error reported in 
parentheses. Time-invariant community characteristics controlled in Panel B are dummies of gradient, distance to densely inhabited district, 
city planning zone, and agricultural promotion area. For covariate matching in panel C, the standard errors are estimated by the variance 
estimator suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Propensity score matching in panel C was performed based on local linear matching 
with replacement using an Epanechnikov kernel. The standard errors were obtained from bootstrapping with 100 repetitions. A common 












( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Panel A. DID Estimates (OLS, raw difference)
Readjustment dummy 0.00725 0.00686 0.0143 0.0242*** 0.0112* 0.00842 ‐0.0117*
(0.00580) (0.00747) (0.0118) (0.00879) (0.00665) (0.00833) (0.00653)
Constant 0.0173*** 0.0566*** ‐0.000375 0.00283 0.0123*** 0.0121** 0.0249***
(0.00340) (0.00549) (0.00166) (0.00295) (0.00334) (0.00470) (0.00537)
Observations 1,073 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072 1,073
Adjusted R
2 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.003
Panel B. DID Estimates （OLS, with time‐invariant community characteristics)
Readjusted dummy 0.00706 0.00683 0.00928 0.0238*** 0.00929* 0.0185** ‐0.00965
(0.00654) (0.00842) (0.00640) (0.00844) (0.00554) (0.00834) (0.00750)
Constant 0.00704 0.0208 ‐0.00103 0.0422** 0.0355** 0.0409 0.00601
(0.0156) (0.0277) (0.00626) (0.0211) (0.0162) (0.0253) (0.0191)
Observations 1,065 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,065
Adjusted R
2 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.067 0.060 0.044 0.020
Panel C. DID‐matching estimates (ATT of farmland readjustment)
Covariate matching (n = 5) ‐0.00349 0.0125 0.0143 0.0284*** 0.0205*** 0.0185** ‐0.0133
(0.00936) (0.00924) (0.0111) (0.00799) (0.00617) (0.00779) (0.00928)
Covariate matching (n = 10) ‐0.00275 0.0106 0.0146 0.0254*** 0.0200*** 0.0168* ‐0.0124
(0.00787) (0.00840) (0.00909) (0.00886) (0.00678) (0.00872) (0.00815)
PSM: local linear (bw = 0.06) ‐0.000846 0.00714 0.0149 0.0269*** 0.0178*** 0.0151 ‐0.00626
(0.00878) (0.00901) (0.0128) (0.00977) (0.00646) (0.00982) (0.00754)
PSM: local linear (bw = 0.1) ‐0.00246 0.00562 0.0150 0.0271*** 0.0179*** 0.0155* ‐0.00633




Table 5. Difference-in-differences estimates on agricultural labor 
 







































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. DID estimates
Readjusted dummy 0.0751*** 0.0966*** 0.00127 0.0395 0.00230 0.0125
(0.0145) (0.0265) (0.0153) (0.0303) (0.0121) (0.0241)
Readjusted dummy* ‐0.0110 ‐0.0817** 0.00136
    gradient (gentle) (0.0378) (0.0407) (0.0296)
Readjusted dummy* ‐0.0461 ‐0.0299 ‐0.0274
    gradient (steep) (0.0343) (0.0378) (0.0320)
Gradient (gentle) ‐0.0431** ‐0.0243 ‐0.0141 0.0126 0.0129 0.0599* ‐0.0172 ‐0.0167 ‐0.0149
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0306) (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0346) (0.0121) (0.0130) (0.0268)
Gradient (steep) ‐0.117*** ‐0.0826*** ‐0.0617** 0.0440** 0.0445** 0.0695** ‐0.0389*** ‐0.0379** ‐0.0266
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0292) (0.0208) (0.0220) (0.0325) (0.0126) (0.0151) (0.0248)
Distance to DID (0.5 to 1 hr) ‐0.0241 ‐0.0149 ‐0.0135 0.00412 0.00427 0.00357 ‐0.00549 ‐0.00523 ‐0.00416
(0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Distance to DID (1 to 1.5 hr) 0.0169 0.0316 0.0324 ‐0.0203 ‐0.0201 ‐0.0207 0.0372* 0.0376** 0.0383**
(0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191)
Distance to DID (more than 1.5 hr) ‐0.0888 ‐0.0790* ‐0.0687 0.0294 0.0296 0.0131 0.00129 0.00154 0.00998
(0.0692) (0.0457) (0.0503) (0.0459) (0.0457) (0.0504) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104)
City planning area 0.0847 0.0558 0.0492 ‐0.122** ‐0.123** ‐0.128** 0.0210 0.0202 0.0164
    (Urbanization promotion area) (0.0677) (0.0678) (0.0680) (0.0488) (0.0490) (0.0501) (0.0456) (0.0454) (0.0445)
City planning area ‐0.00238 ‐0.00218 ‐0.00425 ‐0.0131 ‐0.0131 ‐0.0178 0.0193 0.0193 0.0186
    (Urbanization control area) (0.0239) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0135)
City planning area 0.0332* 0.0364** 0.0368** ‐0.0237 ‐0.0237 ‐0.0232 0.00935 0.00947 0.00974
    (Blank area) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0116)
Agricultural promotion area 0.0571 0.0373 0.0332 ‐0.0893* ‐0.0896* ‐0.0833* 0.0187 0.0182 0.0149
    (Blank area) (0.0432) (0.0431) (0.0432) (0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0353)
Agricultural promotion area 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.117*** ‐0.0573 ‐0.0576 ‐0.0540 ‐0.00316 ‐0.00375 ‐0.00583
    (Farmland) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0420) (0.0423) (0.0425) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0339)
% change in number of farmers 0.0840*** 0.0840*** 0.0853***
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0231)
% change in number of farm households ‐0.0649** ‐0.0655** ‐0.0667**
(0.0275) (0.0281) (0.0279)
Constant ‐0.350*** ‐0.388*** ‐0.400*** 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.259*** ‐0.0422 ‐0.0436 ‐0.0492
(0.0429) (0.0434) (0.0468) (0.0451) (0.0460) (0.0483) (0.0369) (0.0387) (0.0458)
Observations 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,065 1,065 1,065
Adjusted R
2 0.083 0.103 0.104 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.029 0.029 0.03126 
 
Table 6. Heterogeneous effects by gradient of paddies 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard error reported in 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Readjustment dummy ‐0.0138 0.0184 0.0203 0.0451*** 0.0385*** 0.0536** ‐0.00732
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0181) (0.0156) (0.0111) (0.0228) (0.0106)
Readjustment dummy *  0.0383** ‐0.00193 ‐0.00650 ‐0.0475** ‐0.0390** ‐0.0561** 0.00800
    gradient (gentle) (0.0184) (0.0209) (0.0188) (0.0215) (0.0174) (0.0266) (0.0158)
Readjustment dummy *  0.0214 ‐0.0283 ‐0.0229 ‐0.0144 ‐0.0424*** ‐0.0428* ‐0.0128
    gradient (steep) (0.0147) (0.0187) (0.0179) (0.0229) (0.0134) (0.0246) (0.0183)
Observations 1,065 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,065
Adjusted R





Table A1. Balancing test 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels respectively. 
t‐test t‐test
Variable Treated  Control %bias p‐value Treated  Control %bias p‐value
Panel A. Bandwidth=0.06
Ratio of part‐time farm households 0.924 0.898 22.2 0.000 *** 0.924 0.911 10.9 0.066 *
Ratio of elderly farmers 0.371 0.392 ‐12.9 0.038 ** 0.372 0.370 1.2 0.845
Number of farm households 22.5 18.0 28.1 0.000 *** 22.0 23.1 ‐7.1 0.322
Gradient (paddies)
    Gentle 0.271 0.283 ‐2.7 0.664 0.275 0.250 5.5 0.381
    Steep 0.222 0.567 ‐75.3 0.000 *** 0.225 0.243 ‐3.9 0.513
Distance to DID (densely inhibited district)
    0.5‐1.0 hour 0.202 0.382 ‐40.3 0.000 *** 0.205 0.202 0.7 0.898
    1.0‐1.5 hour 0.046 0.108 ‐23.1 0.000 *** 0.047 0.049 ‐0.9 0.866
    >1.5 hour 0.002 0.004 ‐2.9 0.644 0.002 0.003 ‐1.2 0.838
Zoning for city planning area
    Urbanization promotion area 0.020 0.002 17.7 0.003 *** 0.012 0.019 ‐6.4 0.400
    Urbanization control area 0.228 0.083 40.9 0.000 *** 0.230 0.229 0.2 0.984
    Blank area 0.287 0.265 4.9 0.427 0.289 0.286 0.6 0.921
Zoning for agricultural promotion area
    Blank area 0.145 0.143 0.7 0.914 0.145 0.151 ‐1.5 0.813










Ratio of part‐time farm households 0.924 0.898 22.2 0.000 *** 0.924 0.910 11.5 0.054 *
Ratio of elderly farmers 0.371 0.392 ‐12.9 0.038 ** 0.372 0.371 0.5 0.935
Number of farm households 22.5 18.0 28.1 0.000 *** 22.0 23.3 ‐8.2 0.257
Gradient (paddies)
    Gentle 0.271 0.283 ‐2.7 0.664 0.275 0.248 5.9 0.344
    Steep 0.222 0.567 ‐75.3 0.000 *** 0.225 0.243 ‐3.9 0.512
Distance to DID (densely inhibited district)
    0.5‐1.0 hour 0.202 0.382 ‐40.3 0.000 *** 0.205 0.206 ‐0.3 0.952
    1.0‐1.5 hour 0.046 0.108 ‐23.1 0.000 *** 0.047 0.053 ‐2.2 0.681
    >1.5 hour 0.002 0.004 ‐2.9 0.644 0.002 0.003 ‐1.2 0.838
Zoning for city planning area
    Urbanization promotion area 0.020 0.002 17.7 0.003 *** 0.012 0.024 ‐11.7 0.159
    Urbanization control area 0.228 0.083 40.9 0.000 *** 0.230 0.228 0.5 0.948
    Blank area 0.287 0.265 4.9 0.427 0.289 0.284 1.2 0.856
Zoning for agricultural promotion area
    Blank area 0.145 0.143 0.7 0.914 0.145 0.144 0.5 0.944















Figure 1. Trends in agricultural labor 
Source: MAFF (2007). 
Note: Figures are aggregate of all Japanese farm households, excluding those in Hokkaido. Due 
to changes in definitions, there is no continuity in the figures between 1980 and 1985. Figures 





























a) Before. Plots had irregular shapes, and their sizes averaged 0.05–0.07 ha each. 
 
 
b) After. Plots were reshaped and enlarged to a mean plot size of 0.5 ha each. 
 
Figure 2. An example of a farmland consolidation project in Niigata, Japan 
Source: Niigata Prefecture Website: http://www.pref.niigata.lg.jp/HTML_Article/003kajikawaugann.pdf  
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